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Abstract— We consider a distributed secret sharing system that
consists of a dealer, n storage nodes, and m users. Each user is
given access to a certain subset of storage nodes, where it can
download the stored data. The dealer wants to securely convey a
specific secret sj to user j via storage nodes, for j “ 1, 2, . . . ,m,
in such a way that no user gets any information about other users’
secrets in an information-theoretic sense. To this end, the dealer
encodes secrets into several secret shares and loads them into the
storage nodes. Given a certain number of storage nodes we find
the maximum number of users that can be served in such sys-
tems and construct schemes that achieve this. We further define
two major properties for such distributed secret sharing systems;
communication complexity is defined as the total amount of data
that users need to download in order to reconstruct their secrets;
and storage overhead is defined as the total size of data loaded by
the dealer into the storage nodes normalized by the total size of se-
crets. Lower bounds on minimum communication complexity and
storage overhead are characterized given any n and m. Further-
more, we construct distributed secret sharing protocols, under
certain conditions on the system parameters, that simultaneously
attain these lower bounds, thereby providing schemes that are
optimal in terms of both the communication complexity and the
storage overhead. It is shown how to modify the proposed proto-
cols in order to construct schemes with balanced storage load and
communication complexity.
Index Terms— Secret sharing, distributed storage, multi-user
security
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing, introduced by Shamir [1] and Blakely [2],
is central in many cryptographic systems. It has found ap-
plications in cryptography and secure distributed computing
including secure interactive computations [3]–[7], secure stor-
age [8]–[10], generalized oblivious transfer [11], [12], and
threshold cryptography [13]–[15]. A secret-sharing scheme
involves a dealer, who has a secret, a set of users, and a collec-
tion A of subsets of users, which is called the access structure.
A secret-sharing scheme for the access structure A is a scheme
for distributing the secret by the dealer among the users while
guaranteeing the following. 1) Secret recovery: any subset in
the access structure A can recover the secret from its shares;
2) Collusion resistance: for any subset not in A, the aggregate
data of users in that subset reveals no information about the
secret.
Most cryptographic protocols involving secret sharing as-
sume that the central user, called the dealer, has a direct reliable
and secure communication channel to all the users. In such set-
tings, it is assumed that once the dealer computes the shares of
secret, they are readily available to the users. In many scenar-
ios, however, the dealer and users are nodes of a large network.
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In general, the communication between the dealer node and
users can be through several relay nodes, as in a relay network
or through intermediate network nodes, as in a network cod-
ing scenario. Alternatively, in a distributed storage scenario,
the dealer can be thought as a master node controlling a certain
set of servers or storage nodes, while each user has access to a
certain subset of servers.
In this paper, we consider the later scenario. In particular, the
system model is shown in Figure 1. The dealer is considered as
a central entity that controls a given set of servers, also referred
to as storage nodes, and can load data to them. Alternatively, in
an application concerning multiple-access wireless networks,
one can think of middle nodes, sitting between the dealer and
users, as resource elements in different time or frequency, while
each user has access to a certain subset of resource elements.
We further consider a multi-user secret sharing scenario, in the
sense that there is a designated secret, independently generated
for each user, to be conveyed to that user. We require the secret
sharing protocol to be secure implying that each user does not
get any information, in the information-theoretic sense, about
other users’ secrets. The system model, security condition, and
our approach to construct secret sharing protocols for this sys-
tem are described next.
A. System model
A distributed secret sharing system, shown in Figure 1, con-
sists of a dealer, n storage nodes, and m users. The goal of this
system is to enable the dealer to securely convey a specific se-
cret to each user via storage nodes. In this system model:
a) For each user j, Aj Ď rns, where rns def“ t1, 2, 3, ..., nu,
denote the set of all storage nodes that user j has access
to. The set Aj is referred to as the access set for the user
j. For each i P Aj , user j can read the entire data loaded
into node i. Let
A
def“ tAj : j P rmsu (1)
denote the set of all access sets, which is called the access
structure.
b) Storage nodes are passive; they do not communicate with
each other. Also, the users do not communicate with each
other.
c) Let sj P Fq denote the secret for user j. Also, sj’s are
uniformly distributed and mutually independent.
d) The dealer has access to all the storage nodes but it does
not have direct access to the users.
We aim at designing distributed secret sharing protocols to
encode the secrets into secret shares, and distribute them in the
storage nodes in such a way that: 1) Each user j can success-
fully reconstruct its designated secret sj ; 2) User j does not get
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Fig. 1: System model
any information about sl, for any l ‰ j. This is defined more
precisely as follows.
Definition 1: A distributed secret sharing protocol (DSSP)
is a bundle of pA , E ,Znˆh,Dq, where
i) A is the access structure as defined in (1).
ii) E : Fmq Ñ Fhq is an encoding function, for some h ě m,
which relates to the storage overhead of the system as
specified later. The input to the encoding function E is
s “ ps1, s2, ..., smqt as the vector of all secrets. The out-
put y “ Epsq is the vector of all data to be distributed and
stored in the storage nodes. Let y “ py1, y2, . . . , yhqt.
iii) Z “ rzi,rsnˆh, where zi,r “ 1 if yr is stored in i-th stor-
age node, otherwise zi,r “ 0. The matrix Z is referred
to as the storing matrix and the outcome of this, specify-
ing which data symbols are stored at each storage node, is
referred to as the storage profile. Let yj denotes the vec-
tor of all data stored in nodes indexed by elements of the
access set Aj .
iv) D is a collection of m decoding functions Dj : F|yj |q Ñ
Fq , for j P rms, such that Djpyjq “ sj . In other words,
each user is able to successfully reconstruct its own se-
cret. This is referred to as the correctness condition.
The protocol is also secure in the information theoretic sense,
i.e.,
@j, l P rms, l ‰ j : Hpsl|yjq “ Hpslq. (2)
In order to evaluate the efficiency of DSSPs, we focus on
two important aspects, namely storage overhead and communi-
cation complexity as defined next.
By definition of Z “ rzi,rsnˆh in Definition 1 the total num-
ber of Fq-symbols stored in the storage nodes is
k1 def“
nÿ
i“1
hÿ
r“1
zi,r.
The storage overhead, also referred to as SO, of DSSP is then
defined as
SO def“ k
1
m
. (3)
Note that the correctness condition must be satisfied for m mu-
tually independent and uniformly distributed secrets. Therefore,
k1 ě m and consequently, SO ě 1.
Let cj denote the total number of symbols that the user j
needs to download from the storage nodes in the access set Aj
in order to reconstruct sj . Note that cj ď |yj |, since user j may
not need to download all its accessible data. Then the commu-
nication complexity C is defined as
C
def“
mÿ
j“1
cj . (4)
B. Main Results
We first consider the problem of finding the maximum num-
ber of users that can be served in a DSSP given a certain num-
ber of storage nodes. This maximum number is derived using a
necessary and sufficient condition on access sets in a DSSP that
relates to Sperner families in combinatorics. We further present
a method for constructing DSSPs that serve the maximum num-
ber of users.
For a given number of users m and number of storage nodes
n, a DSSP with minimum communication complexity C de-
fined in (4) is called a communication-efficient DSSP. We solve
a discrete optimization problem to provide a lower bound on
the minimum communication complexity. We further construct
DSSPs that are communication-efficient, i.e., they achieve the
minimum possible communication complexity when m is a bi-
nomial coefficient of n.
We further construct DSSPs with nearly optimal and optimal
storage overhead for any given parameters m and n. In the pro-
posed scheme with optimal storage overhead, no external ran-
domness is required and the total size of data to be stored on
storage nodes is equal to the total size of secrets. Consequently,
this provides the optimal storage overhead of one. Combining
this with communication-efficient DSSPs yields optimality of
both the communication complexity and the storage overhead.
Finally, it is shown how to modify the optimal construc-
tions of DSSPs in order to have both balanced storage load,
i.e., the number of data symbols stored on each node and bal-
anced communication complexity, i.e., the number of symbols
downloaded from each node.
C. Shamir’s Scheme and Related Works
The pk, tq secret sharing scheme proposed by Shamir in [1],
is as follows. Given a secret s P Fq it produces k secret shares
d1, d2, . . . , dk P Fq in such a way that
a) the secret s can be reconstructed given any t or more of
the secret shares, and
b) the knowledge of any t ´ 1 or fewer secret shares does
not reveal any information about s, in the information-
theoretic sense.
To this end, a pt ´ 1q-degree polynomial P pXq is constructed
as
P pxq “ s`
t´1ÿ
i“1
pix
i, (5)
where pi’s are i.i.d and are selected uniformly at random from
Fq . Let γ1, γ2, . . . , γk denote k distinct non-zero elements from
Fq . The secret shares are produced by evaluating P pxq at γi’s,
i.e.,
@i P rks di “ P pγiq.
3We refer to the encoder E : Fq Ñ Fkq that produces
pd1, d2, . . . , dkq according to this procedure given the input s
as pk, tq Shamir’s secret encoder.
Given any t secret shares P pxq is interpolated and is uniquely
determined. This is because the degree of P pxq is at most t ´
1 and each secret share specifies one interpolation point lead-
ing to t distinct interpolation points. Then s “ P p0q is recon-
structed. We refer to this process as Shamir’s secret decoder.
The process of generating secret shares by evaluating P pXq
and then recovering the secret by interpolating it is essentially
same as Reed-Solomon encoding and decoding process. The
close connection between the two was noted in [16].
There are several previous works that have considered
Shamir’s scheme in the context of networks [17] and dis-
tributed storage systems [18], [19]. In these works, there is
only one secret, as in the original Shamir’s scheme, to be dis-
tributed to users either as nodes of a network [17] or as users of
a distributed storage system [18], [19], in a collusion-resistant
way. However, we consider a multi-user secret sharing sce-
nario, where there is one designated secret for each user, and
the secret shares are distributed over a set of storage nodes.
Also, in our constructed schemes we guarantee that each user
does not get any information about other users’ secrets, thereby
providing security in a multi-user sense.
II. DSSP WITH MAXIMUM NUMBER OF USERS
In this section, we consider the following problem: What
is the maximum possible number of users that can be served
in a DSSP given a certain number of storage nodes? A neces-
sary and sufficient condition on access sets in a DSSP is shown
which relates to Sperner families in combinatorics. This rela-
tion is invoked to present a method for constructing DSSPs that
serve maximum number of users.
Lemma 1: For a DSSP with access structure A defined in
(1):
Aj Ć Al, (6)
for all j, l P rms with j ‰ l.
Proof: : Assume to the contrary that Aj Ă Al for some
j ‰ l. Therefore, the entire accessible data by user j can also
be accessed by user l. Since user j can retrieve sj by the cor-
rectness condition, user l can also retrieve sj . This means the
security condition is violated and the protocol is not a DSSP as
defined in Definition 1, which is a contradiction.
Collections of subsets satisfying the condition of Lemma 1
are well-studied combinatorial objects. Such a collection A is
called a Sperner family [20]. For any Sperner familyA we have
[20]
|A | ď
ˆ
n
tn{2u
˙
, (7)
and more generally a necessary condition for existence of a
Sperner family with ak subsets of size k, for k P rns, is that
[21]
k“nÿ
k“0
ak`
n
k
˘ ď 1. (8)
Since the number of users is m “ |A | , (7) implies an upper
bound on m, i.e.,
m ď
ˆ
n
tn{2u
˙
. (9)
Next, we use Shamir’s secret sharing scheme to construct a
DSSP when the access structure A is a Sperner family. Let
tj “ |Aj |. In this construction, a ptj , tjq Shamir’s secret shar-
ing scheme is used independently for each user j, both in the
encoding of sj by the dealer and decoding it by user j. Such
DSSP is denoted by S-DSSP{A , n}. In other words, the con-
dition in Lemma 1 is a sufficient condition for existence of a
DSSP. More specifically, S-DSSP{A , n} is described as fol-
lows:
i) A is a Sperner family consisting of subsets of rns.
ii) Epsq “ pE1ps1q, E2ps2q, . . . , Empsmqq, where Ej is a
ptj , tjq Shamir’s secret encoder and tj “ |Aj |.
iii) @j P rms : Zrai,j , τj´1` is “ 1 for i P rtjs, where τj “
t1` ...` tj and τ0 “ 0; and Aj “ ta1,j , a2,j , . . . , atj ,ju.
All other entries of Z are zero.
iv) Dj is the ptj , tjq Shamir’s secret decoder, for j P rms.
Lemma 2: S-DSSP{A , n} is a DSSP satisfying all proper-
ties in Definition 1.
Proof: S-DSSP{A , n} assigns a tj-subset of rns to user j.
It encodes sj into tj secret shares using Shamir’s scheme with
the threshold tj and random seeds generated independently
from other users. It then stores one share on each node in Aj
as specified by Z. Clearly, each user can reconstruct its secret
by invoking Shamir’s secret decoder. Also, Shamir’s scheme
guarantees the security condition, specified in (2), since A is
a Sperner family and consequently, no user other than user j
has access to all of its tj shares. Therefore, S-DSSP{A , n} is
a DSSP satisfying all properties in Definition 1.
We can pick a Sperner family A with the maximum size
|A | “ ` ntn{2u˘ and then construct a S-DSSP{A , n}. This satis-
fies all properties of a DSSP by Lemma 2 and serves the maxi-
mum possible number of users given a certain number of stor-
age nodes n.
III. COMMUNICATION-EFFICIENT DSSP
In this section, we derive a lower bound on the communica-
tion complexity of DSSPs, i.e., the amount of data that users
need to download in order to reconstruct the secrets.
For given parameters m and n as the number of users and
storage nodes, respectively, a DSSP with minimum communi-
cation complexity C defined in (4) is called a communication-
efficient DSSP. It is assumed that
m ď
ˆ
n
tn{2u
˙
,
as in (9). Otherwise, by Lemma 1 and (7) a DSSP does not exist.
A certain class of DSSPs, called tight DSSPs, defined as fol-
lows, is useful to derive lower bounds on the communication
complexity and to construct communication-efficient DSSPs.
This will be shown in Lemma 3.
4Definition 2: We say a DSSP is a tight DSSP (T-DSSP) if
every user downloads exactly one Fq-symbol from each node in
its access set.
Note that, for example, every S-DSSP, defined in Section II,
is a T-DSSP.
Lemma 3: For any DSSP with communication complexity
C, there exists a T-DSSP with the same number of users and
storage nodes, and communication complexity C˜ such that
C˜ ď C.
Proof: For each user l, let A˜l Ă Al denote the set with the
minimum size such that user l can reconstruct its secret sl by
downloading data from A˜l. Note that user l has to download at
least one symbol from each node in A˜l. Therefore,
mÿ
j“1
|A˜j | ď C. (10)
The security condition implies that
@j, l P rms, j ‰ l : A˜l Ć Aj , (11)
otherwise user j would be able to reconstruct sl. Let
A˜
def“ tA˜j : @j P rmsu, which is a Sperner family.
We then construct a S-DSSP associated with the access struc-
ture A˜ which has communication complexity C˜ “ řmj“1 |A˜j |.
This follows from the fact that in a S-DSSP, each user down-
loads exactly one data symbol from the nodes in its access set.
This together with (10) and recalling that a S-DSSP is also a
T-DSSP complete the proof.
Note that the communication complexity of a T-DSSP de-
pends only on its associated access structure. Let ak denote the
number of subsets of size k in the access structure of the T-
DSSP. Then its communication complexity is given by
C “
nÿ
k“1
kak. (12)
Therefore, by Lemma 3, one can consider minimizingřn
k“1 kak to find a communication-efficient DSSP provided
that a Sperner family with such ak’s exists. To this end, we
consider the following discrete optimization problem:
min
tn{2uÿ
k“1
kak (13)
s.t. @ k P t1, ..., tn{2uu : ak P NY t0u (14)
tn{2uÿ
k“1
ak “ m, (15)
tn{2uÿ
k“1
ak`
n
k
˘ ď 1. (16)
Constraint (14) is set because ak’s must be non-negative. Con-
straint (15) is set because the sum of ak’s is equal to the total
number of users m. Also, by (8), (16) is a necessary condition
for existence of a Sperner family with ak subsets of size k. If
such Sperner family exists for the solution of this optimization
problem, then we will have a communication-efficient DSSP.
Otherwise, the minimum objective function is a lower bound
for the minimum communication complexity. Note that due to
the reciprocity of the binomial coefficients, we have ak “ 0 for
all
X
n
2
\ ă k in the solution of this optimization problem.
The idea is to first solve a continuous version of this opti-
mization problem, stated below, and then extract the solution
for the discrete version from the solution of the continuous ver-
sion. Consider the following problem:
min
tn{2uÿ
k“1
kαk (17)
s.t. @ k P t1, ..., tn{2uu : αk ě 0, (18)
tn{2uÿ
k“1
αk “ m, (19)
tn{2uÿ
k“1
αk`
n
k
˘ ď 1. (20)
where αk P R. This optimization problem can be solved by
satisfying Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) condition [22]. Let ψ˚
denote the minimum of the objective function in the above con-
tinuous optimization problem. Suppose that ψ˚ is achieved by
the choice of α˚k , for k “ 1, 2, . . . , tn{2u. It is shown in the Ap-
pendix that at most two of α˚k ’s are non-zero. Furthermore, it
is shown that if two non-zero α˚k ’s exist, then their indices are
consecutive. In particular, the solution is described as follows.
Let i denote the largest integer such thatˆ
n
i
˙
ď m. (21)
Then
αi˚ “
`
n
i`1
˘´m`
n
i`1
˘´ `ni˘
ˆ
n
i
˙
, (22)
αi˚`1 “
m´ `ni˘`
n
i`1
˘´ `ni˘
ˆ
n
i` 1
˙
, (23)
and α˚k “ 0, for k ‰ i, i ` 1. Also, by (65) the minimum pos-
sible objective function is
ψ˚ “ iαi˚ ` pi` 1qαi˚`1. (24)
Let C˚ denote the minimum of the objective function in the
discrete optimization problem. It is clear that
rψ˚s ď C˚. (25)
The following lemma shows that C˚ “ rψ˚s.
Lemma 4: We have
C˚ “ rψ˚s .
Furthermore, this minimum objective function is achieved by
choosing ai “ tαi˚ u, ai`1 “
P
αi˚`1
T
, and ak “ 0, for k ‰
i, i` 1.
Proof: Let ai “ tαi˚ u, ai`1 “
P
αi˚`1
T
, and ak “ 0, for
k ‰ i, i` 1. Let  “ αi˚ ´ tαi˚ u. Note that αi˚ `αi˚`1 “ m and
m is an integer. Therefore, αi˚`1 “
P
αi˚`1
T´ . In other words,
5the fraction part of αi˚`1 is 1´ . Then one can write
ai “ αi˚ ´ , ai`1 “ αi˚`1 `  (26)
where 0 ď  ă 1. First, we show feasibility of this solution by
checking the constraints of the optimization problem. It is easy
to see that (14) and (15) are satisfied. Also,
ai`
n
i
˘ ` ai`1` n
i`1
˘ “ αi˚`n
i
˘ ` αi˚`1` n
i`1
˘ ` p 1` n
i`1
˘ ´ 1`n
i
˘ q ď 1,
where the equality holds by (26) and the inequality holds by
(20) and noting that 1p ni`1q ´
1
pniq is negative . Therefore, (16) is
also satisfied which shows that the solution is feasible. At last,
it is shown that this solution achieves equality in (25). For this
solution, we have
C˚ “ iai ` pi` 1qai`1 “ iαi˚ ` pi` 1qαi˚`1 `  “ ψ˚ ` .
(27)
and therefore, C˚ “ rψ˚s.
The Following theorem is the summary of this section’s re-
sults.
Theorem 5: For a given number of users m and storage
nodes n, any T-DSSP with the following access structure A is
a communication-efficient DSSP: A is a Sperner family that
contains tαi˚ u of i-subsets of rns and
P
αi˚`1
T
of pi` 1q-subsets
of rns, where i is the maximum integer that satisfies (21), and
αi˚ and αi˚`1 are as calculated in (22) and (23).
Proof: The theorem follows by (12) and the solution to the
discrete optimization problem with properties shown in Lem-
ma 4.
Corollary 6: If a Sperner family A as specified in Theo-
rem 5 exists, then S-DSSPtA , nu is a communication-efficient
DSSP. Otherwise, C˚, given in (27), is a lower bound for the
minimum possible communication complexity.
In particular, if m is a binomial coefficient of n, i.e.,
m “ `ni˘, then a Sperner family A exists; A is the set of all
i-subsets of rns. Then S-DSSPtA , nu is a communication-
efficient DSSP.
IV. DSSPS WITH NEARLY OPTIMAL AND OPTIMAL
STORAGE OVERHEAD
In this section, two schemes are proposed towards construct-
ing DSSPs with optimal storage overhead. In the first scheme,
a few number of random symbols are used as external random
seed for the code construction. Consequently, the storage over-
head is slightly larger than the optimal value of one. Hence,
the first scheme is referred to as the DSSP with nearly op-
timal storage overhead. Then, the first scheme is modified
in order to construct DSSPs with optimal storage overhead.
To this end, we extract the random seed needed in the first
scheme from the secret shares of a few users, while ensuring
that the security condition is still guaranteed. In the result-
ing protocol, no external randomness is required, and hence,
the total size of data to be stored on storage nodes is equal to
the total size of secrets. Consequently, this provides the op-
timal storage overhead of one. Furthermore, this method can
be applied to communication-efficient DSSPs constructed in
Section III, thereby providing DSSPs that have both optimal
communication complexity and optimal storage overhead.
A. DSSP with Nearly Optimal Storage Overhead
Let m and n denote the number of users and storage nodes,
respectively. Consider a system with access structure A con-
sisting of m subsets Aj , for j P rms, of rns forming a Sperner
family. Such condition is necessary, by Lemma 1, in order to be
able to construct a valid DSSP. This condition is also sufficient
for the proposed protocol in this Section. Note that in the con-
struction of DSSPs we consider the access structure to be a part
of the protocol design, as defined in Definition 1. However, it is
still interesting to see necessary and/or sufficient conditions on
the access structure in the proposed DSSPs. Also, suppose that
q ą maxjPrms |Aj | and let γ1, γ2, . . . , γq´1 denote the non-
zero elements of Fq .
First, consider a S-DSSP protocol, as described in Section II,
which applies Shmir’s secret sharing method to each secret in-
dependently. In particular, for j P rms and l P rk ´ 1s, where
k “ |Aj |, pj,l is chosen independently and uniformly at random
from Fq . Then the polynomial PjpXq is constructed as
Pjpxq “ sj `
k´1ÿ
l“1
pj,lx
l. (28)
Then the evaluations Pjpγ1q, ..., Pjpγkq are stored at nodes in-
dexed by elements in Aj , the access set of user j. In this proto-
col the storage overhead is
řm
j“1 |Aj |{m which can be very far
from the optimal value of one, as stated in Section I-A.
In order to reduce the storage overhead, the idea is to ensure
that for all j P rms, the evaluation of Pj’s over the evaluation
points γi’s have significant overlaps with each other. This idea
is elaborated through the rest of this section.
Suppose that n symbols, denoted by y1, y2, . . . , yn, are cho-
sen independently and uniformly at random from Fq . Roughly
speaking, these symbols serve as random seed in our proposed
protocol. Initially, yi is stored in the storage node i, for all i P
rns. Then for each user user j, only one data symbol is gen-
erated through the encoding of its secret sj , as discussed next,
and stored in one of the nodes in Aj . This implies that the total
size of data stored at the storage nodes, in terms of number of
Fq-symbols, is n`m, and the storage overhead is 1` nm .
Consider user j, for some j P rms. Without loss of generality
suppose that Aj “ t1, 2, . . . , ku. To encode the secret sj , we
first construct Pj by considering the following system of linear
equations: $’’’&’’’%
Pjpγ1q “ y1,
Pjpγ2q “ y2,
...
Pjpγk´1q “ yk´1,
(29)
6which can be rewritten as$’’’’’&’’’’’%
sj ` pj,1γ1 ` pj,2γ21 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` pj,k´1γk´11 “ y1,
sj ` pj,1γ2 ` pj,2γ22 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` pj,k´1γk´12 “ y2,
...
sj ` pj,1γk´1 ` pj,2γ2k´1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` pj,k´1γk´1k´1 “ yk´1,
(30)
and alternatively, in the matrix form, as
D pj “ y˜j , (31)
where
pj “ ppj,1, pj,2, . . . , pj,k´1qt,
y˜j “ py1 ´ sj , y2 ´ sj , . . . , yk´1 ´ sjqt, (32)
and
D
def“
»———–
γ1 γ
2
1 . . . γ
k´1
1
γ2 γ
2
2 . . . γ
k´1
2
...
. . .
...
γk´1 γ2k´1 . . . γ
k´1
k´1
fiffiffiffifl . (33)
Since D is a Vandermonde matrix, it is invertible and (31) has
a unique solution, i.e.,
pj “ D´1y˜j . (34)
By selecting such pj as the coefficients of Pj , except its con-
stant coefficient which is equal to sj , we somewhat enforce the
first k´1 evaluations of Pj to be equal to the random seed gen-
erated a priori. Then Pjpγkq “ yj`n is the new data symbol
generated in the encoding process of sj . We refer to yj`n as
the data symbol associated with user j. This encoding process
can be also described using the following equation:
yj`n “ sj ` at y˜j , (35)
where
at “ “ γk γ2k . . . γk´1k ‰D´1, (36)
and y˜j and D are defined in (32) and (33), respectively.
The new data symbol yj`n, determined in (35), is stored in
the storage node k, the node with the largest index in Aj . Note
that we could initially pick any k ´ 1 nodes in Aj and use the
random seed stored at them to construct Pj , as in (29). Then the
generated data symbol yj`n would be stored in the remaining
node of Aj . In the next section, we discuss methods to do this
in a more structured way in order to obtain a balanced storage
profile.
The proposed protocol together with the storage profile are
demonstrated in an example, discussed next.
Example 4.1: Let n “ 5,m “ 10. Suppose that the access
sets are all 2-subsets of r5s given as follows:
A1“t1, 2u,A2“t2, 4u,A3“t3, 5u,A4“t1, 3u,A5“t2, 5u,
A6“t4, 5u,A7“t2, 3u,A8“t1, 5u,A9“t3, 4u,A10“t1, 4u.
Also, let q “ 3, and non-zero and distinct evaluation points
γ1 “ 1, γ2 “ 2, as elements of F3, are considered. Then the en-
coded data symbols, generated by (35), together with the stor-
age profile are shown in Table I.
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5
y1 y2 y3 y4 y5
2y1 ´ s1 2y1 ´ s4 2y2 ´ s2 2y3 ´ s3
2y2 ´ s7 2y3 ´ s9 2y2 ´ s5
2y1 ´ s10 2y4 ´ s6
2y1 ´ s8
TABLE I: Storage Profile in Example 4.1
To prove that the security condition, specified in (2), is satis-
fied the following lemma is useful.
Lemma 7: Data symbols y1, y2, . . . , ym`n generated ac-
cording to the proposed protocol are uniformly distributed and
mutually independent. In other words, the vector of all data
symbols is full entropy.
Proof: Recall that the first n data symbols y1, y2, . . . , yn
are initially selected uniformly and independently at random.
Hence, py1, y2, . . . , ynq is a full entropy vector. Then,
Hpyn`1, . . . , yn`m|y1, . . . , ynq “ Hps1, . . . , sm|y1, . . . , ynq
(37)
“ Hps1, . . . , smq (38)
“ m log q, (39)
where (37) holds since (35) implies that given py1, . . . , ynq
there is a one-to-one mapping between pyn`1, . . . , yn`mq and
ps1, . . . , smq, (38) holds since the random seed py1, . . . , ynq is
independent of ps1, . . . , smq, and (39) holds since it is assumed
that the vector of all secrets is full entropy. Using this together
with the chain rule we have
Hpy1, . . . yn`mq “Hpy1, . . . , ynq
`Hpyn`1, . . . , yn`m|y1, . . . , ynq
“n log q `m log q
“pn`mq log q,
which completes the proof.
The following theorem summarizes the results of this sub-
section.
Theorem 8: The proposed protocol in this Section is a valid
DSSP satisfying all conditions in Definition 1.
Proof: Note that user j, with |Aj | “ k, has access to all k
evaluations of its associated polynomial Pj and consequently,
can recover sj by invoking Shamir’s secret decoder. Hence, the
correctness condition is satisfied in this protocol. What remains
to show is that the security condition, specified in (2), is also
satisfied.
Note that the access sets are assumed to form a Sperner fam-
ily. Hence, for j ‰ l, with |Aj | “ k, there exists at least one γi,
7i P rks, such that Pjpγiq is not accessed by user l. Let this data
symbol Pjpγiq be denoted by yp´lqj . Then we have
Hpsj |ylq
(a)ě Hpsj | y z yp´lqj q (b)“ Hpyp´lqj | y z yp´lqj q
(c)“ Hpyp´lqj q (d)“ log q,
(40)
where (a) holds since conditioning does not increase the en-
tropy, (b) holds because given any k ´ 1 evaluations of Pj , out
of k available ones, there is a one-to-one mapping between the
remaining evaluation of Pj and sj , (c) holds because data sym-
bols are independent, and (d) holds because data symbols are
uniformly distributed. Also, note that
Hpsj |ylq ď Hpsjq ď log q. (41)
Combining (40) with (41) implies that
Hpsj |ylq “ Hpsjq “ log q,
which completes the proof.
As mentioned before, the storage overhead of the proposed
protocol is 1 ` nm , which is very close to the optimal value of
one provided that m is much larger than n. Hence, we refer
to the proposed protocol in this subsection as the DSSP with
nearly optimal storage overhead.
B. DSSP with Optimal Storage Overhead
The considered parameters are same as in Section IV-A.
However, an extra condition on the field size q and a certain
choice of access sets for n of the users, as explained later, will
be required in the proposed protocol.
In the proposed protocol in this section, no external random-
ness is required and in fact, the optimal storage overhead value
of one is attained. The idea is to modify the proposed DSSP
with nearly optimal SO, constructed in Section IV-A, by ini-
tially encoding secrets of n users into n data symbols and then
utilizing them as the random seed needed in encoding of the
remaining m´ n secrets.
To initialize the protocol, n users, indexed by 1, 2, . . . , n, are
picked. The access sets for these users are specified as follows:
Aj “ tj, j ` 1, . . . , j ` k ´ 1u, (42)
for j “ 1, 2, . . . , n, where the indices of storage nodes are con-
sidered modulo n, i.e., n` l “ l. The parameter k is arbitrary
as long as 1 ď k ă n. When combining DSSP with optimal
storage overhead toegther with communication-efficient DSSP,
k needs to be picked accordingly, e.g., k “ i or k “ i ` 1,
where i is given by Theorem 5. The remaining access sets can
be arbitrary as long as A form a Sperner family.
The evaluation polynomials Pj’s, for j P rns, are constructed
in such a way that the following system of linear equations is
satisfied:
$’’’&’’’%
P1pγ1q “ y1, P2pγ1q “ y2, . . . Pnpγ1q “ yn,
P1pγ2q “ y2, P2pγ2q “ y3, . . . Pnpγ2q “ y1,
...
...
. . .
...
P1pγkq “ yk, P2pγkq “ yk`1, . . . Pnpγkq “ yk´1,
(43)
where Pj’s have the form specified by (28). Note that the sys-
tem in (43) has nk linear equations. Also, the total number of
variables is nk. This is because there are pk ´ 1qn unknown
variables pj,l’s, for j P rns and l P rk ´ 1s, together with n un-
known variables y1, y2, . . . , yn. Next, we show that the equa-
tions in (43) are linearly independent, under certain conditions,
thereby establishing that the system has a unique solution for
pj,l’s and yi’s. We further show how to store the resulting yi’s
in the storage nodes according to a certain access structure A .
The system of linear equations in (43) can be rewritten as:
Ab` s1 “ 0, (44)
where
b “ pp1,1, ..., p1,k, p2,1, ..., p2,k, ..., pn,1, ..., pn,k, y1, ..., ynqt,
s1 “ ps1, ..., s1, s2, ..., s2, ..., sn, ..., snqt,
where each sj is repeated k times in s1, and Apknqˆpknq is as
follows:»—————————————–
γ1 . . . γ
k´1
1 ´1
...
. . .
...
. . .
γk . . . γ
k´1
k ´1
γ1 . . . γ
k´1
1 ´1
...
. . .
...
. . .
γk . . . γ
k´1
k ´1
. . . . . .
fiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffifl
,
(45)
which consists of n copies of the following k ˆ pk ´ 1q matrix
B
def“
»———–
γ1 γ
2
1 . . . γ
k´1
1
γ2 γ
2
2 . . . γ
k´1
2
...
...
. . .
...
γk γ
2
k . . . γ
k´1
k
fiffiffiffifl ,
together with n copies of ´Ikˆk, each shifted one column
to right, consecutively. The goal is then to show that A is
non-singular, under certain conditions, as specified in the next
lemma. To simplify such conditions and also for ease of calcu-
lation, let γi “ γi, for i “ 1, 2, . . . , k, where γ is a primitive
element of Fq .
Lemma 9: If pq ´ 1q ffl in for i P rks, then the matrix A,
specified in (45), is non-singular.
Proof: Let ri,j denote the row inA indexed by pj´1qk`i,
for j P rns and i P rks. We show that ri,j’s are linearly inde-
pendent. Suppose that a linear combination of ri,j’s is zero, i.e.,
λ1,1r1,1`¨ ¨ ¨`λk,1rk,1`¨ ¨ ¨`λ1,nr1,n`¨ ¨ ¨`λk,nrk,n “ 0.
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Btλi “ 0, (46)
where λi “ pλi,1, λi,2, . . . , λi,kqt for all i and
Bt “
»———————–
γ γ2 . . . γk
γ2 pγ2q2 . . . pγ2qk
...
γk´1 pγk´1q2 . . . pγk´1qk
fiffiffiffiffiffiffiffifl
.
Furthermore,
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
λ1,1 ` λ2,n ` λ3,n´1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` λk,n´k`1 “ 0,
λ1,2 ` λ2,1 ` λ3,n ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` λk,n´k`2 “ 0,
...
λ1,n´1 ` λ2,n´2 ` λ3,n´3 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` λk,n´k “ 0,
λ1,n ` λ2,n´1 ` λ3,n´2 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` λk,n´k`1 “ 0.
(47)
Since Bt is a Vandermonde matrix, it is full row rank. Conse-
quently, its kernel space is one dimensional. This together with
(46) result in λj “ ηjv, where ηj is a scalar coefficient and v is
a non-zero vector in the kernel ofBt. Let v “ pv1, v2, . . . , vkqt.
Then, one can write λi,j “ ηjvi for all i and j. Substituting this
in (47) results in:
Vη “ 0,
where η “ pη1, η2, . . . , ηnqt and
V
def“
»———————–
v1 0 0 . . . vk vk´1 . . . v2
v2 v1 0 . . . 0 vk . . . v3
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 vk . . . v1 . . . 0
fiffiffiffiffiffiffiffifl
nˆn
.
If V is non-singular, all ηj’s are zero. This implies that all
λi,j’s are also zero. Note that all vi’s can not be zero be-
cause the kernel space of Bt is one dimensional. Therefore,
A is non-singular if and only if V is non-singular. Note that
V is a circulant matrix and is non-singular if and only if
gcdpxn ´ 1, V pxqq “ 1 [23], where V pXq is the associated
polynomial of the circulant matrix V:
V pxq “ v1 ` v2x` v3x2 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` vkxk´1.
Note that Btv “ 0. Therefore, γiV pγiq “ 0, for i P rk ´ 1s.
Equivalently, all γi’s are roots of xV pxq. Since the degree of
V pxq is at most pk´ 1q, it has at most pk´ 1q roots. Therefore,
we can write
V pxq “ c0px´ γqpx´ γ2q . . . px´ γk´1q,
for some constant c0. Since γ is a primitive element of Fq and
pq ´ 1q ffl in for all i P rks, then γin ‰ 1 for all 1 ď i ď k.
In other words, none of V pXq’s roots is an n-th root of unity.
Hence, xn ´ 1 and V pxq have no roots in common implying
that gcdpxn ´ 1, V pxqq “ 1. Consequently, V is non-singular.
This implies that A is also non-singular, which completes the
proof.
Corollary 10: If the condition in Lemma 9 is satisfied, then
(43) defines a one-to-one mapping between ps1, s2, . . . , snq and
py1, y2, . . . , ynq.
Proof: Assuming that the condition in Lemma 9 is satis-
fied, A is non-singular. This implies that for any vector of se-
crets sj’s, there is a unique solution for yj’s. Furthermore, for
given yj’s, (43) defines n interpolation equations of polyno-
mials Pjpxq of degree at most k ´ 1, for which there exists a
unique solution. Hence, there is a one-to-one mapping between
ps1, s2, . . . , snq and py1, y2, . . . , ynq.
Suppose that the condition in Lemma 9 is satisfied, e.g., q ą
kn ` 1. Then (44) can be written as b “ ´A´1s1. Note that
b contains all data symbols y1, y2, . . . , yn as its last n entries.
Also, s1 “ K ps1, . . . , snqt, where
K “
»———————————————————————–
1
...
1
,/./- k
1
...
1
,/./- k
. . .
1
...
1
fiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffifl
knˆn
.
Let A1 be a submatrix of ´A´1 consisting of last n rows of
´A´1. Now we can write the encoding equation for users
1, . . . , n as follows:
py1, . . . , ynqt “ E ps1, . . . , snqt, (48)
where E def“ A1K and is referred to as the seed encoding ma-
trix. Note that by Corollary 10, there is a one-to-one mapping
between ps1, s2, . . . , snq and py1, y2, . . . , ynq and hence, E is
non-singular.
In order to attain the optimal storage overhead, each data
symbol yj must be stored only once, while ensuring that the
correctness condition for users 1, 2, . . . , n is satisfied. For
j P rns, yj is stored at node j. Hence, by the choice of Aj’s
specified in (42) together with (43), user j has access to all k
realizations of Pj and by invoking Shamir’s secret decoder, can
reconstruct sj .
The encoding of secrets sj , for j “ n ` 1, . . . ,m, is ex-
actly same as in the DSSP with nearly optimal SO, discussed
in Section IV-A. In other words, the same protocol with m ´
n users and assuming y1, y2, . . . , yn, constructed from secrets
s1, s2, . . . , sn as discussed above, as the initial random seed is
deployed. In Theorem 11 it is proved that the proposed proto-
col is a valid DSSP and hence, it is referred to as the DSSP
9with optimal SO. Before that, a construction of such DSSP is
demonstrated in the following example.
Example 4.2: Let m “ 10 and n “ 5, as in Example 4.1.
Let also k “ 2 and q “ 5, which satisfy the condition of Lem-
ma 9. Then 5 subsets with access sets specified in (42) for users
indexed by 1, . . . , 5 are picked. In particular, the following ac-
cess sets are considered for all the 10 users:
A1“ t1, 2u, A2“t2, 3u, A3“t3, 4u, A4“ t4, 5u, A5“ t5, 1u,
A6“ t1, 3u, A7“ t1, 4u, A8“ t1, 5u, A9“ t2, 4u, A10“ t3, 5u,
where y6, . . . , y10 are stored on storage nodes indexed by the
largest elements of A6, . . . , A10, respectively. Let γ “ 2 be
picked as a primitive element of F5 and then γ1 “ 2, γ2 “ 4
are the evaluation points. In the first step of the protocol, which
involves encoding s1, . . . , s5 as the random seed, the seed en-
coding matrix E in (48) is as follows:
E “
»————–
1 3 4 2 1
1 1 3 4 2
2 1 1 3 4
4 2 1 1 3
3 4 2 1 1
fiffiffiffiffifl .
Then, y1, . . . , y5 are computed from s1, . . . , s5 as
y1 “ s1 ` 3s2 ` 4s3 ` 2s4 ` s5,
y2 “ s1 ` s2 ` 3s3 ` 4s4 ` 2s5,
y3 “ 2s1 ` s2 ` s3 ` 3s4 ` 4s5,
y4 “ 4s1 ` 2s2 ` s3 ` s4 ` 3s5,
y5 “ 3s1 ` 4s2 ` 2s3 ` s4 ` s5,
and are used to encode remaining secrets according to the DSSP
with nearly optimal SO. The encoded data symbols together
with the storage profile are shown in the following table:
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5
y1 y2 y3 y4 y5
2y1 ´ s6 2y1 ´ s7 2y1 ´ s8
2y2 ´ s9 2y3 ´ s10
TABLE II: Storage Profile in Example 4.2
Theorem 11: The proposed protocol in this Section is a valid
DSSP satisfying all conditions in Definition 1 and has the stor-
age overhead of one.
Proof: In this protocol, each user j has access to all |Aj |
evaluations of its associated polynomial Pj , which holds for
both the initial n users and the remaining m ´ n users. Hence,
the correctness condition is satisfied by invoking Shamir’s se-
cret decoder. Also, note that the number of data symbols gener-
ated in this protocol is n, equal to the number of users, and each
data symbol is stored exactly once. Hence, the storage overhead
is one, which is the optimal value. What remains to show is that
the security condition is also satisfied.
Since the vector of all secrets is assumed to be full entropy,
then ps1, s2, . . . , snq is also full entropy. This together with Co-
rollary 10 implies that py1, y2, . . . , ynq is full entropy and inde-
pendent of psn`1, sn`2, . . . , smq. Also, by Lemma 7, the vec-
tor of data symbols pyn`1, y2, . . . , ymq is full entropy. Conse-
quently, the vector of all data symbols in this protocol is full
entropy. Then the rest of the proof is similar to the proof of
Theorem 8.
As a consequence of Theorem 11, we refer to the proposed
protocol in this section as the DSSP with optimal storage over-
head. Furthermore, for certain parameters m and n, it is also a
communication-efficient DSSP. This is summarized in the next
Theorem.
Theorem 12: Let m “ `nk˘ for some k ď n{2 and the access
structureA be picked as the set of all k-subsets of rns. Then the
DSSP with optimal storage overhead is also communication-
efficient. In other words, it simultaneously attains the optimal
value for both the communication complexity and the storage
overhead.
Proof: Note that the DSSP with optimal overhead SO is a
T-DSSP, as defined in Definition 2, since each user j download
exactly one data symbol from each node inAj to reconstruct sj .
Also, A is the collection of all k-subsets of n and in particular,
the ones specified in (42). Then, the conditions in Theorem 5
is satisfied, which implies that the proposed protocol is also a
communication-efficient DSSP.
An interesting case of Theorem 12 is when we want to
serve the maximum possible number of users m “ ` ntn2 u˘
for a given n, as stated in Section II. In this case, we have a
communication-efficient DSSP with optimal storage overhead
that also serves the maximum possible number of users.
Next, we discuss the complexity of construction and en-
coding as well as the latency of the encoding process. The
complexity of constructing the DSSP with optimal SO is dom-
inated by computing the inverse matrix A´1. The complexity
of a straightforward Gaussian elimination method for comput-
ing A´1 is Opk3n3q. Note that this needs to be done only once,
and then A can be fixed for encoding purposes. The computa-
tion complexity of encoding the first n secrets is Opn2q, due
to the multiplication of the n ˆ n seed encoding matrix by
the vector of secrets of the first n users, as specified in (48).
In the second step of the encoding process, the computation
of a vector inner product, as specified in (35), is needed for
each of the m ´ n remaining users resulting in a complexity
Oppm ´ nqk˜q, where k˜ is the average size of access sets of
the remaining m ´ n users. Note that one can assume the vec-
tor at is computed a priori, as part of the construction, and
hence, does not have to be computed during the encoding pro-
cess. Hence, a straightforward implementation of the encoding
process results in the encoding complexity Opn2 ` k˜mq. Simi-
larly, the computation complexity of the encoder in the DSSP
with nearly optimal SO is Opk˜mq, where k˜ is the average size
of access sets of all the m users. Moreover, encoding of all
secrets can be done simultaneously in this protocol, i.e., com-
putations can be parallelized, which results in a fast encoder
implementation with latency Opmaxj |Aj |q “ Opnq. However,
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Protocol DSSP with optimal SO
DSSP with nearly
optimal SO
storage
overhead 1 1` nm
encoding
complexity
Opn2 ` k˜mq Opk˜mq
latency Opn2q Opnq
TABLE III: Comparison of DSSPs with optimal and nearly op-
timal SO.
in a DSSP with optimal SO, encoding of the secrets of the first
n users needs to be done first, followed by encoding secrets of
the m ´ n remaining users, which results in Opn2q latency.
Table III summarizes the complexity comparison of the two
protocols proposed in this section. Although DSSP with nearly
optimal SO has a slightly higher SO than the optimal one, it
has a much lower encoding latency and also slightly lower en-
coding complexity. Also, the DSSP with optimal SO requires a
condition on the field size q specified in Lemma 9, in addition
to the natural condition q ą maxjPrms |Aj |.
V. DSSP WITH BALANCED COMMUNICATION
COMPLEXITY AND STORAGE PROFILE
In this section, we discuss how to make the storage profile
and the communication complexity balanced when consider-
ing individual storage loads and communication loads across
the storage nodes.
More specifically, assuming that the storage nodes have the
same capabilities, it is not desired to have a node with a signifi-
cantly larger amount of stored data comparing to another node.
This becomes relevant when the actual limitations on the stor-
age capacity of nodes is taken into account. Similarly, if a sig-
nificantly larger amount of data needs to be downloaded from
one node comparing to another node, that could slow down the
process of reconstructing the secrets.
Suppose that the storage profile vector cs “ pcs1, cs2, . . . , csnq,
corresponding to a certain storage profile, represents the
amount of data stored at the storage nodes, where csi is
the amount of data, in terms of number of Fq-symbols,
stored at node i. Similarly, communication complexity vector
cc “ pcc1, cc2, . . . , ccnq, corresponding to the collection of de-
coding processes D defined in Definition 1, represents the total
amount of data downloaded from the storage nodes to recon-
struct all secrets, where cci is the total amount of downloaded
data from the node i.
Definition 3: We say that a vector is balanced if all entries
are equal. Furthermore, we define the bias of a vector to be the
maximum difference between the entries of the vector, i.e., the
difference between the maximum and the minimum entry. In
the context of access sets, we say that a collection F of subsets
of rns is a balanced collection if each i P rns belongs to the
same number of subsets in F .
For instance, the strategy used in Example 4.2 results in the
storage profile vector p1, 1, 2, 3, 3q, as shown in Table II, with
a bias of 2. Ideally, one would want a balanced storage profile
vector p2, 2, 2, 2, 2q, which we later show is actually possible.
In general, the goal here is to specify the access structure A
and the storing matrix Z in order to reduce the bias of storage
profile vector and communication complexity vector of DSSPs
proposed in Section IV. This, roughly speaking, results in pro-
tocols that are less biased and more balanced.
The following lemma is a key to enable constructing such
DSSPs with balanced properties.
Lemma 13: The set of all k-subsets of rns can be partitioned
into balanced collections of size at most n.
Proof: Let K denotes the set of all k-subsets of rns. For
any A “ ti1, . . . , iku P K , the operator φ : K Ñ K is
defined as follows:
φpAq def“ ti1 ` 1, . . . , ik ` 1u, (49)
with n` 1 “ 1. Note that
φnpAq “ A. (50)
A relation „ over K is defined as follows. We say A „ B if
φlpAq “ B, for some integer l. It can be observed that „ is an
equivalence relation. Consequently, it partitions rns into equiv-
alence classes. We show that these equivalence classes are bal-
anced. Note that (50) implies that each equivalence class con-
tains at most n distinct elements ofK . It fact, it can be shown
that an equivalence class F has d elements, for some d that di-
vides n. If d “ n, then each i P rns belongs to exactly k subsets
in F . Otherwise, for any A P F and i P A, we have!
i, i` d, . . . , i` dpn
d
´ 1q
)
Ď A.
Hence, i and i ` ld, for any i P rds and l P rnd ´ 1s, belong
to the same number of subsets in F . Then one can consider all
elements of rns modulo d, which reduces F to an equivalence
class of kdn -subsets of rds with size d. Hence, each i P rds be-
longs to the same number of subsets in F , which completes the
proof.
An example of the partitioning discussed in the proof of
Lemma 13 is as follows.
Example 5.1: Let n “ 6 and k “ 3. Then, all 3-subsets of
r6s are partitioned into 3 classes of size 6 and one class of size
2, which are all balanced collections.
rt1, 2, 3us“tt1, 2, 3u,t2, 3, 4u,t3, 4, 5u,t4, 5, 6u,t5, 6, 1u,t6, 1, 2uu
rt1, 3, 4us“tt1, 3, 4u,t2, 4, 5u,t3, 5, 6u,t4, 6, 1u,t5, 1, 2u,t6, 2, 3uu
rt1, 3, 6us“tt1, 3, 6u,t2, 4, 1u,t3, 5, 2u,t4, 6, 3u,t5, 1, 4u,t6, 2, 5uu
rt1, 3, 5us“tt1, 3, 5u,t2, 4, 6uu
The partitioning of Lemma 13 enables us to construct DSSPs
with optimal storage overhead while having an almost balanced
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communication complexity and storage profile for any n and
m. However, to this end, we pick the access sets according to
a certain process. Similar to the constructions in Section IV, let
k denote the smallest integer with m ď `nk˘. Then the process
for assigning the access set Aj , as a k-subsets of rns, for each
user j and the storage node inAj that stores the data symbol yj ,
generated for each user j, is described in Algorithm 1 below.
Algorithm 1 ConstructingA andZ for the DSSP with optimal
SO proposed in IV-B
Result: DSSP has balanced cc and cs
A “ H, i “ 1, j “ 1, A “ t1, 2, . . . , ku, Z “ r0snˆm;
while j ď m do
while i R A do
A “ φpAq
end
while A R A do
Aj “ A, A “ A Y tAu, zi,j “ 1.
A “ φpAq, j “ j ` 1.
if i ă n then
i “ i` 1
else
i “ 1
end
end
A “ Any k-subset which is not in A .
end
In particular, in Algorithm 1, access sets are picked one-by-
one for users j “ 1, 2, . . . ,m from equivalence classes by re-
peatedly applying the operation φ, defined in (49). Through this
process, the index of storing node for each user j, the node that
stores the one data symbol yj , is also increased one by one.
Once all subsets in an equivalence class are picked, the next ac-
cess set is picked from another equivalence class in such a way
that the index of next storing node is also increased by 1.
Algorithm 1 with some straightforward modifications works
also for the DSSP with nearly optimal SO, proposed in Section
IV-A. The following theorem summarizes results of Section V.
Theorem 14: For any m and n, with k being the smallest in-
teger with m ď `nk˘, the DSSP with optimal SO together with
algorithm 1, to construct the access structureA and the storing
matrix Z, has a storage profile vector with bias at most 1 and a
communication complexity vector with bias at most k.
Proof: Suppose that m “ nl ` r, where 0 ď r ă n.
Then at the end of Algorithm 1, storage nodes 1, 2, . . . , r store
exactly l ` 1 symbols and storage nodes r ` 1, . . . , n store ex-
actly l symbols. This is because the index of storing node i, that
stores data symbol yj for user j, is increased by 1, modulo n,
as j increases by 1 through Algorithm 1.
Now consider an equivalence class F of size d, as con-
structed in the proof of Lemma 13, and suppose the subsets in
F are assigned as access sets to users j ` 1, . . . , j ` d. Since
F is a balanced collection, as defined in Definition 3, and since
each user downloads exactly one data symbol from the nodes
in its access set, the number of data symbols downloaded by
users j ` 1, . . . , j ` d from each of the storage nodes is equal
to kdn . At the end of Algorithm 1, the communication complex-
ity vector may not be balanced. This occurs only when the last
equivalence class is partially used to assign access sets to users.
In that case the bias of the communication complexity vector is
at most kdn ď k, where d is the size of the last class being used.
This completes the proof.
Note that in the special case with m “ `nk˘, we have a
communication-efficient DSSP with optimal storgae over-
head, by Theorem 12, together with balanced communication
complexity vector. It also has balanced storage profile vec-
tor provided that
`
n
k
˘
is divisible by n, e.g., n being a prime
number. As an example, we modify the constructed DSSP in
example 4.2 by using algorithm 1 to construct A and Z.
Example 5.2: By modifying the access structure and the
storing matrix of the DSSP in example 4.2 we have
A1“ t1, 2u, A2“ t2, 3u, A3“ t3, 4u, A4 “ t4, 5u, A5“ t5, 1u,
A6“ t1, 3u, A7“ t2, 4u, A8“ t3, 5u, A9“ t4, 1u, A10“ t5, 2u,
where, by slight abuse of terminology, the first element of Aj ,
in the order written above, stores the data symbol yj . The result-
ing encoded secrets together with the storage profile is shown
in Table,IV.
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5
y1 y2 y3 y4 y5
2y3 ´ s6 2y4 ´ s7 2y5 ´ s8 2y1 ´ s9 2y2 ´ s10
TABLE IV: Storage Profile in Example IV
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we considered a distributed secret sharing sys-
tem consisting of a dealer, n storage nodes, and m users. The
dealer aims at securely sharing a specific secret sj with user j
via storage nodes, in such a way that no user gets any informa-
tion about other users’ secrets. Given a certain number of stor-
age nodes we find the maximum number of users that can be
served in such a system. Also, lower bounds on minimum com-
munication complexity and storage overhead are characterized
for any n and m. Then we propose distributed secret sharing
protocols, under certain conditions on the system parameters,
that attain these lower bounds, thereby providing schemes that
are optimal in terms of both the communication complexity and
storage overhead. Also, the proposed protocols are modified to
have balanced communication and storage across the storage
nodes.
There are several directions for future work. In this paper,
the problems of designing access structure, i.e., which nodes
each user has access to, and the coding problem, i.e., how to
encode and decode secrets, are considered jointly. In fact, the
choices of access structures are not completely arbitrary in our
proposed protocols. For different protocols, we discussed suffi-
cient conditions required on the access structure. An interesting
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direction for future work is to study these two problems sepa-
rately and consider designing efficient coding schemes given a
specific access structure. In particular, an interesting problem is
the following: what is the necessary and sufficient condition on
the access structure that ensures existence of distributed secret
sharing protocols with optimal storage overhead and/or mini-
mum communication complexity?
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APPENDIX
In this section the solution to continuous optimization prob-
lem defined in (17)-(20) is determined by satisfying KKT con-
ditions. The Lagrangian can be written as:
J “
tn{2uÿ
k“1
kαk ´ λ1p
tn{2uÿ
k“1
αk ´mq
´ λ2p1´
tn{2uÿ
k“1
αk`
n
k
˘ q ´ tn2 uÿ
k“1
µkαk,
where λ1,λ2 and µk’s are Lagrange multipliers. Also KKT con-
ditions are:
@k : k ´ λ1 ` λ2`n
k
˘ ´ µk “ 0 (51)
@k : µk ě 0 (52)
@k : α˚k ě 0 (53)
λ2 ě 0 (54)
@k : µkα˚k “ 0 (55)
λ2p1´
tn2 uÿ
k“1
α˚k`
n
k
˘ q “ 0 (56)
tn{2uÿ
k“1
α˚k “ m, (57)
tn{2uÿ
k“1
α˚k`
n
k
˘ ď 1. (58)
Since both the objective function and inequality constraints
are convex and equality condition is an affine function,
KKT conditions are sufficient to ensure that the solution
is the global minimum. The key point that makes it possi-
ble to derive the solution of (51)-(58) is convexity of the
discrete function fpkq def“ 1pnkq , assuming n is fixed. Define
mpk1,k2q
def“ fpk2q´fpk1qk2´k1 , the slope of the line connecting
pk1, fpk1qq and pk2, fpk2qq. Also let dk def“ mpk,k`1q de-
note one step increment at point pk, fpkqq. It is proved in the
following lemma that dk is strictly increasing in k.
Lemma 15: dk ă dk`1 for all 0 ď k ď n´ 2.
Proof:
dk “ 1` n
k`1
˘ ´ 1`n
k
˘ “ k!pn´ k ´ 1q!p2k ´ n` 1q
n!
“ p2k ´ n` 1q
n
`
n´1
k
˘
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Case 1: 0 ď k ă n´12 . In this case we have
0 ď pn´ 1´ 2pk ` 1qq ă pn´ 1´ 2kq,
0 ă 1`n´1
k`1
˘ ď 1`n´1
k
˘ .
Multiplying inequalities yields
0 ď pn´ 1´ 2pk ` 1qq`n´1
k`1
˘ ă pn´ 1´ 2kq`n´1
k
˘
which implies that
dk ă dk`1 ď 0
Case 2: n´12 ď k ď n´ 2. In this case we have
0 ď p2k ´ n` 1q ă p2pk ` 1q ´ n` 1q
0 ă 1`n´1
k
˘ ă 1`n´1
k`1
˘ .
Again, multiplying inequalities yields
0 ď p2k ´ n` 1q`n´1
k
˘ ă p2pk ` 1q ´ n` 1q`n´1
k`1
˘ ,
which implies that
0 ď dk ă dk`1.
This completes the proof of lemma.
Using Lemma 15, an inequality is proved in the following
lemma which is used in the proof of Theorem 17.
Lemma 16: For k1, k2, k3 P N, with 0 ď k1 ă k2 ă k3 ď`
n
tn2 u
˘
, we have:
mpk1,k2q ă mpk2,k3q.
Proof: For k, k1 P N with k ă k1,
mpk,k1q “ 1k1 ´ k
k1´1ÿ
i“k
di
Using this together with Lemma 15 we have
mpk1,k2q “
1
k2 ´ k1
k2´1ÿ
i“k1
di ă 1
k2 ´ k1
k2´1ÿ
i“k1
dk2 “ dk2
and
mpk2,k3q “
1
k3 ´ k2
k3´1ÿ
i“k2
di ě 1
k3 ´ k2
k3´1ÿ
i“k2
dk2 “ dk2 ,
which concludes the lemma.
Theorem 17: In the solution to the optimization problem, at
most two of α˚k ’s are non-zero. Furthermore, if two of them are
non-zero, then their indices are consecutive.
Proof: Assume to the contrary there exist two non-
consecutive integers k1 and k3 such that α˚k1 , α
˚
k3
‰ 0. Let
k1 ă k3, without loss of generality. One can find k2 P N such
that k1 ă k2 ă k3. By (55) µk1 and µk3 must be zero Also, by
(51) we can write:
k1 ´ λ1 ` λ2 1` n
k1
˘ “ 0
k3 ´ λ1 ` λ2 1` n
k3
˘ “ 0
Solving this for λ1 and λ2 results in
λ1 “
k3p nk1q ´
k1p nk3q
1
p nk1q ´
1
p nk3q
(59)
λ2 “ k3 ´ k11
p nk1q ´
1
p nk3q
(60)
By substituting λ1 and λ2 from (59) and (60), respectively, into
(51) for k2, µk2 is derived as follows:
µk2 “ k2 ´ λ1 ` λ2 1` n
k2
˘ “ k2 ´ k3` n
k1
˘ ` k3 ´ k1` n
k2
˘ ` k1 ´ k2`n
3
˘
“ pk3 ´ k2qp 1` n
k2
˘ ´ 1` n
k1
˘ q ` pk2 ´ k1qp 1` n
k2
˘ ´ 1` n
k3
˘ q
“ pk3 ´ k2qpk2 ´ k1qpmpk1,k2q ´mpk2,k3qq ă 0,
where the last inequality follows by the assumption on
k1, k2, k3 and Lemma 16. This contradicts (52) which com-
pletes the proof.
Theorem 17 implies that αi˚ ,αi˚`1 ě 0 for some i and α˚k “ 0
for k ‰ i, i ` 1. Next, i, αi˚ , and αi˚`1 are derived. Note that
λ2 ą 0 by (60) and hence, (56) implies that the inequality con-
dition in (58) turns into equality, i.e.,
αi˚`
n
i
˘ ` αi˚`1` n
i`1
˘ “ 1. (61)
Furthermore, (57) implies that
αi˚ ` αi˚`1 “ m. (62)
Therefore, αi˚ and αi˚`1 can be derived by combining (61) and
(62) as follows:
αi˚ “
`
n
i`1
˘´m`
n
i`1
˘´ `ni˘
ˆ
n
i
˙
(63)
αi˚`1 “
m´ `ni˘`
n
i`1
˘´ `ni˘
ˆ
n
i` 1
˙
(64)
Note that αi˚ and αi˚`1 must be non-negative by (53). Therefore,
i is the largest integer such that
i ď
ˆ
n
k
˙
.
Also, the minimum of the objective function ψ is given by
ψ˚ “ iαi˚ ` pi` 1qαi˚`1. (65)
